forces access to the region and ultimately to launch amphibious operations against the island. These modernization efforts were aimed specifically at enabling the Chinese air force, navy, army and strategic rocket force to blockade Taiwan, deny U.S. It has spent the quarter-century since then modernizing its military so that it would never find itself in a similar situation again. Beijing did not like having to back down during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 when the United States sent two carrier strike groups to Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression. Consider the changed conventional military balance. Now, none of these conditions remain in place. Given the United StatesвЂ™s overwhelming nuclear superiority during this era, and the credibility this lent to its implicit nuclear threat, this meant that the potential costs to Beijing of any cross-strait invasion were simply so high that no anticipated political benefit could justify the risk.ДЇast forward to today. would be forced to use nuclear weapons to defend the island. As China became wealthier and more militarily capable, deterrence was upheld by the possibility that any attempt to use conventional military force to liberate Taiwan might escalate to the point where the U.S. But for the most part вЂ“ and especially during the period of вЂњpeaceful riseвЂќ diplomacy initiated by Deng Xiaoping вЂ“ this was a background aspiration rather than a pressing concern.ДЇinally, cross-strait conventional deterrence was effectively backstopped by U.S. ToД«e sure, the recovery of all the nationвЂ™s historical territory, including Taiwan, has been part of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) raison dвЂ™ГЄtre since the founding of the PeopleвЂ™s Republic. Second, for most of this period BeijingвЂ™s level of motivation was in any case relatively low. The combination of Chinese military weakness вЂ“ the PLA was neither organized nor equipped for serious amphibious operations вЂ“ and Taiwanese-American conventional military strength meant that Beijing was dissuaded from even attempting to use military force to compel Taiwan to return to the fold. support, TaiwanвЂ™s armed forces during this period were sufficiently strong to deny the PLA any realistic possibility of conducting a successful amphibious assault on Taiwan. Three factors were key to deterring China from attacking Taiwan.

And for most of the period since Chiang Kai-shekвЂ™s nationalist forces retreated to the island in 1949, the combined forces of Taiwan and the United States haveВ done just that.

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